NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. *See* Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

FILED BY CLERK

JAN 21 2011

COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,) 2 CA-CR 2010-0276-PR
) DEPARTMENT A
Respondent,)
-) MEMORANDUM DECISION
v.	Not for Publication
) Rule 111, Rules of
LOUIS ANTHONY TRUJILLO,) the Supreme Court
,)
Petitioner.)
)
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE SU	JPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY
Cause No. CF	220082521
Honorable Deboral	n Bernini, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED	; RELIEF DENIED
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney	_
By Jacob R. Lines	Tucson
	Attorneys for Respondent
Louis A. Truiillo	Tucson
Louis A. Trujillo	In Propria Persona
	HI FIODITA PERSONA

HOWARD, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner Louis Trujillo was convicted of trafficking in stolen property. He seeks review of the trial court's order denying his of-right petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P., in

which he alleged, inter alia, that there had been an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea.¹ "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." *State v. Swoopes*, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Trujillo has not sustained his burden of establishing any such abuse here.

In his petition for review, Trujillo asserts that the jewelry he was convicted of trafficking had "in reali[]ty . . . belonged to [him]." To the extent he thereby argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding there had been a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea, we disagree. As the court correctly concluded, Trujillo "admitted to every essential element of the crime[] to which he pled guilty." At the change of plea hearing, Trujillo admitted that "what I'm accused of I'm guilty of"; that he had not had permission to take the jewelry he was accused of trafficking; and that he had pawned it or sold it. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding those facts sufficient to establish Trujillo had trafficked stolen property in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-2301(B)(2), (3), 13-2307(A).

Trujillo also apparently suggests his attorney at sentencing was ineffective in failing to object to Trujillo's mother's statements, on the ground that the woman who

¹Trujillo's petition for post-conviction relief apparently encompassed not only his guilty plea to trafficking in CR20082521, but also a guilty plea to kidnapping as a domestic violence offense in CR20083660. His petition for review, however, lists only CR20082521 and discusses only the facts of that case. We therefore limit our review to that action. And, because Trujillo makes no argument in his petition for review about the other claim presented in his petition for post-conviction relief, we do not address it. *See* Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii) (petition for review shall contain "[t]he issues which were decided by the trial court and which the defendant wishes to present to the appellate court for review").

gave the statements was not, in fact, his mother, as Trujillo now claims. And he also

argues he did not deserve an aggravated sentence. We decline to address these claims

because they were not raised in his petition for post-conviction relief. This court will not

consider for the first time on review issues that have neither been presented to, nor ruled

on by, the trial court. State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (App.

1980); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). Therefore, although we grant review, we

deny relief.

/s/ Joseph W. Howard JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Chief Judge

CONCURRING:

/s/ J. William Brammer, Jr.

J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Presiding Judge

/s/Philip G. Espinosa

PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge